After exactly two years of a genocidal war, the TPLF and the Federal Government signed a ceasefire agreement in Pretoria in November 2022. As part of the agreement, both parties agreed to establish an inclusive Interim Administration for Tigray. However, the process lacked transparency, and neither side clearly explained the basis on which the administration was formed.
Formation of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA)
The TPLF took charge of forming the Interim Regional Administration, while the Prime Minister had the authority to approve and appoint its leader.
The Prime Minister did not include his Tigrayan allies in the administration, leaving the TPLF as the dominant force.
From the start, the Interim Administration was seen as flawed. Many in Tigray, especially opposition groups, criticized it for being non-inclusive.
The TPLF allocated itself a majority (50+1) of administrative positions, granted military representatives a share, and included a few non-TPLF actors from groups like the Global Society of Tigray Scholars and Professionals (GSTS) and opposition parties like Baytona.
With this skewed coalition and no clear roadmap, the TPLF was responsible for selecting the Interim Administration’s leader. Initially, Debretsion Gebremichael was proposed but rejected by the Prime Minister. In a second vote, Getachew Reda won by a narrow margin, and the Prime Minister approved his appointment as President of the Interim Regional Administration. This process took over six months, creating further instability.
Despite choosing Getachew through the central committee voting system, TPLF’s leadership seemed divided and uncertain. Many executive members expressed dissatisfaction, and broader confusion persisted regarding the content and implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
Growing Tensions: TPLF Office vs. Interim Administration
A power struggle quickly emerged between the Interim Regional Administration and the TPLF Office (the party structure).
The TPLF Office demanded full control over governance, while the Interim Administration argued for autonomy, claiming it was a coalition of multiple entities.
This sparked debates on party-government separation, which Getachew’s TPLF colleagues opposed. However, underlying issues seemed to go beyond this disagreement.
The TPLF’s Disputed 14th Congress
The party began preparations for its 14th Congress, but internal structures and factions criticized the process as illegal.
The Inquiry Commission, the Preparation Committee, and even Getachew Reda himself raised concerns that the congress violated party bylaws and lacked legitimacy.
Despite the criticism, the TPLF Office proceeded with its congress held in August 2024, dismissed Getachew Reda from party positions and membership, and replaced him with its other loyalists.
The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) rejected this congress, deeming it illegitimate and ordering another general meeting. The party is still on probation, told in February to hold a congress within three months.
As a result, the TPLF remains legally unrecognized, and the TPLF Office’s authority is in question.
Factional Rivalry Turns into Power Struggle
Since claiming to have held its congress, the TPLF Office has demanded that Getachew Reda and his colleagues in the Interim Government be replaced.
Getachew, in response, dismissed their legitimacy, arguing that:
Their congress was illegal, and they had no authority to make demands.
His appointment as Interim President was done in consultation with the Federal Government, meaning any leadership change required negotiations with the Prime Minister.
While the Federal Government’s stance remains unclear, the TPLF Office branded Getachew’s faction as illegitimate and launched an aggressive political campaign against it.
Both factions have since engaged in mutual accusations, propaganda, and power plays, deepening divisions within Tigray.
Security Forces and the Shift in Power
The Tigray Security Forces, aka TDF, leaders were initially expected to remain neutral, as they were part of the Interim Administration but also longtime TPLF loyalists.
In the midst of the party split, military leaders hesitated over which faction to support.
Last month, key security leaders openly sided with Debretsion’s TPLF Office, recognizing its 14th Congress as legitimate. However, some security leaders opposed this shift.
Forcible Power Transfers Begin
Now, security forces aligned with the TPLF Office are actively facilitating power transfers by force.
March 10–12, 2025:
Armed groups loyal to the TPLF Office seized control of the mayor’s office in Adigrat, replacing officials with appointees of the Office, which they claim are appointees of the respective councils.
Similar takeovers occurred in Adigudom, Samre, and other administrative units.
The TPLF Office celebrated these actions, presenting them as a political triumph.
In Adigudom, Mekelle, and other places, clashes erupted, and casualties were reported as civilians protested against the power grab (‘re-grab’) in some of the places.
Several Interim Government officials have been reportedly abducted or taken by the security forces to unknown places. Many are posting pictures of those claimed to be under the hands of the armed forces. Among them are the administrator of the Eastern Zone Solomon Tikue, Vice administrator of Seharti Wereda Solomon Embay, Mayor of Adigudom-Eg. Andom, and his vice Awet Tewolde, Yorga Hiluf-Public relations officer, and other officials of the town.
What Kind of Coup Is This?
Some supporters of the TPLF Office faction view Getachew Reda’s faction’s actions as an intraparty coup within the TPLF, comparing it to what Abiy Ahmed and his OroMara coalition did to the EPRDF in 2017–2018. From their perspective, what they are doing now is a counter-intraparty coup.
However, for Getachew’s faction and the Interim Administration, this is more than just an internal party dispute, they see it as a full-scale regional coup against the Interim Administration and the Pretoria Agreement, as forces are forcibly installing ”new” administrators.
It remains unclear how the Federal Government and other stakeholders will characterize the unfolding crisis in Tigray, as no official response has been made public so far.
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Tigray’s Power Struggle: From the Pretoria Agreement to the Current Crisis-Events’ Flow
After exactly two years of a genocidal war, the TPLF and the Federal Government signed a ceasefire agreement in Pretoria in November 2022. As part of the agreement, both parties agreed to establish an inclusive Interim Administration for Tigray. However, the process lacked transparency, and neither side clearly explained the basis on which the administration was formed.
Formation of the Tigray Interim Regional Administration (TIRA)
The TPLF took charge of forming the Interim Regional Administration, while the Prime Minister had the authority to approve and appoint its leader.
The Prime Minister did not include his Tigrayan allies in the administration, leaving the TPLF as the dominant force.
From the start, the Interim Administration was seen as flawed. Many in Tigray, especially opposition groups, criticized it for being non-inclusive.
The TPLF allocated itself a majority (50+1) of administrative positions, granted military representatives a share, and included a few non-TPLF actors from groups like the Global Society of Tigray Scholars and Professionals (GSTS) and opposition parties like Baytona.
With this skewed coalition and no clear roadmap, the TPLF was responsible for selecting the Interim Administration’s leader. Initially, Debretsion Gebremichael was proposed but rejected by the Prime Minister. In a second vote, Getachew Reda won by a narrow margin, and the Prime Minister approved his appointment as President of the Interim Regional Administration. This process took over six months, creating further instability.
Despite choosing Getachew through the central committee voting system, TPLF’s leadership seemed divided and uncertain. Many executive members expressed dissatisfaction, and broader confusion persisted regarding the content and implementation of the Pretoria Agreement.
Growing Tensions: TPLF Office vs. Interim Administration
A power struggle quickly emerged between the Interim Regional Administration and the TPLF Office (the party structure).
The TPLF Office demanded full control over governance, while the Interim Administration argued for autonomy, claiming it was a coalition of multiple entities.
This sparked debates on party-government separation, which Getachew’s TPLF colleagues opposed. However, underlying issues seemed to go beyond this disagreement.
The TPLF’s Disputed 14th Congress
The party began preparations for its 14th Congress, but internal structures and factions criticized the process as illegal.
The Inquiry Commission, the Preparation Committee, and even Getachew Reda himself raised concerns that the congress violated party bylaws and lacked legitimacy.
Despite the criticism, the TPLF Office proceeded with its congress held in August 2024, dismissed Getachew Reda from party positions and membership, and replaced him with its other loyalists.
The National Electoral Board of Ethiopia (NEBE) rejected this congress, deeming it illegitimate and ordering another general meeting. The party is still on probation, told in February to hold a congress within three months.
As a result, the TPLF remains legally unrecognized, and the TPLF Office’s authority is in question.
Factional Rivalry Turns into Power Struggle
Since claiming to have held its congress, the TPLF Office has demanded that Getachew Reda and his colleagues in the Interim Government be replaced.
Getachew, in response, dismissed their legitimacy, arguing that:
Their congress was illegal, and they had no authority to make demands.
His appointment as Interim President was done in consultation with the Federal Government, meaning any leadership change required negotiations with the Prime Minister.
While the Federal Government’s stance remains unclear, the TPLF Office branded Getachew’s faction as illegitimate and launched an aggressive political campaign against it.
Both factions have since engaged in mutual accusations, propaganda, and power plays, deepening divisions within Tigray.
Security Forces and the Shift in Power
The Tigray Security Forces, aka TDF, leaders were initially expected to remain neutral, as they were part of the Interim Administration but also longtime TPLF loyalists.
In the midst of the party split, military leaders hesitated over which faction to support.
Last month, key security leaders openly sided with Debretsion’s TPLF Office, recognizing its 14th Congress as legitimate. However, some security leaders opposed this shift.
Forcible Power Transfers Begin
Now, security forces aligned with the TPLF Office are actively facilitating power transfers by force.
March 10–12, 2025:
Armed groups loyal to the TPLF Office seized control of the mayor’s office in Adigrat, replacing officials with appointees of the Office, which they claim are appointees of the respective councils.
Similar takeovers occurred in Adigudom, Samre, and other administrative units.
The TPLF Office celebrated these actions, presenting them as a political triumph.
In Adigudom, Mekelle, and other places, clashes erupted, and casualties were reported as civilians protested against the power grab (‘re-grab’) in some of the places.
Several Interim Government officials have been reportedly abducted or taken by the security forces to unknown places. Many are posting pictures of those claimed to be under the hands of the armed forces. Among them are the administrator of the Eastern Zone Solomon Tikue, Vice administrator of Seharti Wereda Solomon Embay, Mayor of Adigudom-Eg. Andom, and his vice Awet Tewolde, Yorga Hiluf-Public relations officer, and other officials of the town.
What Kind of Coup Is This?
Some supporters of the TPLF Office faction view Getachew Reda’s faction’s actions as an intraparty coup within the TPLF, comparing it to what Abiy Ahmed and his OroMara coalition did to the EPRDF in 2017–2018. From their perspective, what they are doing now is a counter-intraparty coup.
However, for Getachew’s faction and the Interim Administration, this is more than just an internal party dispute, they see it as a full-scale regional coup against the Interim Administration and the Pretoria Agreement, as forces are forcibly installing ”new” administrators.
It remains unclear how the Federal Government and other stakeholders will characterize the unfolding crisis in Tigray, as no official response has been made public so far.
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